Please report vulnerabilities privately via GitHub private vulnerability reporting. Don't open a public issue for security problems.
You can expect an acknowledgement within a week. Fixes are released as a new image version, and the advisory is published once a fix is available.
Only the latest release receives security fixes.
Every release image on GHCR is built from a version tag by
.github/workflows/release.yml, scanned before
it is tagged, signed with Sigstore keyless signing, and published with a SLSA
build-provenance attestation and an SPDX SBOM.
Pin images by digest, and verify a digest before you deploy it:
gh attestation verify oci://ghcr.io/nolsen311/dreadovania-server@sha256:<digest> --repo nolsen311/dreadovania-servercosign verify ghcr.io/nolsen311/dreadovania-server@sha256:<digest> \
--certificate-identity-regexp '^https://github.com/nolsen311/dreadovania-server/.github/workflows/release.yml@refs/tags/v' \
--certificate-oidc-issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.comv0.1.0 only: its tags point to an unsigned image index that wraps the signed
image, so verifying the tag fails. Verify and pin the signed image's own digest
instead, sha256:2a4a6a082d08a82ec2f83019da5b6c9914c616c199a76618930f8b5ca843c5dc
(linux/amd64). Later releases tag the signed digest itself, and the release
workflow checks this before it finishes.
Platforms: releases after ADR 0028 are one multi-arch image for linux/amd64 and
linux/arm64. Verify and pin the index digest above. cosign verify covers each
platform image too, since the release signs them all, and each platform image has
its own SBOM attestation (cosign verify-attestation --type spdxjson on that
platform's digest, listed in the release run's summary).
- Run the container with the hardening in
compose.yaml. - Don't expose the server directly to the internet. Use it on your LAN, or behind a TLS reverse proxy (see docs/adr/0005-tls-lets-encrypt.md).
- The image contains no game content. Never share your game files or keys.