Skip to content

Security: qBitnaut/omarchy-dragon-sl7

SECURITY.md

Security

Reporting a problem

Please report vulnerabilities privately, not in a public issue: use GitHub private vulnerability reporting for this repository. Include what you found, how to reproduce it and the affected package or script. You can expect a first reply within a few days. This is a hobby project with a single maintainer; there is no bug bounty.

Signing key

Packages, the pacman database and the installer ISO checksum are signed with one key:

6387C619EF246F6F20C536B72C3331C78353BA04
  • The fingerprint is also in tools/bootstrap/omarchy-sl7-bootstrap.sh, tools/installer-kit/make-install-usb.sh and pkgs/omarchy-sl7-keyring/omarchy-sl7-trusted. A change to any of them without a matching change here is a red flag.
  • The public key is tools/repo/omarchy-sl7.pub.asc and a copy is published as an asset of the repo-aarch64 and installer-latest releases. Never trust a key file by what it says about itself: compare the fingerprint.
  • Check an ISO by hand: gpg --import omarchy-sl7.pub.asc && gpg --status-fd 1 --verify NAME.iso.sha256.sig NAME.iso.sha256 and require VALIDSIG 6387C619EF246F6F20C536B72C3331C78353BA04. On Windows use Gpg4win.
  • tools/installer-kit/make-install-usb.sh does this check itself and fails closed; --insecure-skip-signature exists for emergencies and prints a warning.

Trust model

What you trust when you install from this project:

  • The maintainer (GitHub account qBitnaut, two-factor authentication on) and the signing key above. The key is stored as a GitHub Actions secret, used only by the release environment (restricted to main), inside a container with no network and no capabilities, pinned to an image digest.
  • GitHub Actions as the build host. Workflow actions are pinned to full commit SHAs, build containers to image digests, and Actions are limited to GitHub-owned and verified creators. Package builds run in a digest-pinned Arch Linux ARM builder image.
  • Upstreams, reviewed and pinned by commit or checksum, never followed blindly:
    • Arch Linux ARM packages and the omacom/omarchy-pkg-builder image
    • the Linux kernel (kernel.org tarballs, checksummed) and valeronm/sl7-mac (Surface Laptop 7 patch series and device trees)
    • Omarchy (basecamp/omarchy, omarchy-iso, omarchy-pkgs), pinned in upstream.lock, (its qcom-firmware-extract and linux-aarch64-pkgbase-shim PKGBUILDs are built from source)
    • nate8199/omarchy-plugin-howdy-face and Howdy (face unlock) and the YuNet / SFace models
    • libcamera (git.libcamera.org, pinned to a commit), iptsd
  • Not trusted: the files on the release are only as good as the signature check. The ISO contains no Microsoft or Qualcomm firmware; it is extracted on your machine from Microsoft's own public driver package.

Out of scope: a compromised maintainer account or GitHub itself (a signature made by the CI key would still verify), and the security of the upstream projects listed above.

There aren't any published security advisories