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[RFC]: Signed updater for standalone Cua Driver on macOS #8320
Provide a Cua-signed update path for standalone CuaDriver.app without giving the calling shell or agent general App Management access.
Motivation and current state
On Apple Silicon macOS 27.2.1, standalone 0.53.0 runs normally, but App Management denies bundle writes from background maintenance. The 0.55.0 CLI still delegates to a shell installer that stops the driver before replacing it. No destructive test was run.
Goals
Verified background updates at the existing app path; preserve working grants and driver availability; refuse before stopping if unauthorized.
Non-goals
No changes to Accessibility, Screen Recording, system policy, or Cua Spaces enrollment.
Proposal
Use a same-team signed, app-scoped updater or Apple-supported signed package. Verify the candidate and admission before stopping; keep a verified rollback.
Alternatives considered
Homebrew targets the same protected bundle. Cua Spaces updates a different bundled driver. Broad App Management is not suitable for a shared agent.
Compatibility and migration
Keep the existing standalone bundle identity and path. Document the supported migration and rollback.
Security, privacy, permissions, and telemetry
Limit update authority to the vendor updater; accept only verified Cua releases; no broad permissions or extra user data collection.
Validation and acceptance evidence
Test signed upgrades in a background user session, denial before stop, grant preservation, and rollback; confirm the new running version.
Unresolved questions
Which signed update mechanism can Cua support for the standalone app?
RFC document pull request
No response
Submission checks
I searched for duplicate issues and RFCs.
This public proposal contains no credentials, private user or partner data, sensitive screenshots, or vulnerability details.
I described the problem, alternatives, migration, and evidence required—not only an implementation preference.
Activity
f-trycua commentedon Nov 21, 2026
Thanks for writing this up as an RFC. We've seen it and the team will read through it. We'll follow up here once we have a view.