Repository navigation
Description
Automated weekly security sweep for fellwork/magna. GitHub access limited to mcp__github__* tools (no gh CLI, no raw REST) — see "Not checked" below. Local checkout could not be git fetch/reset this run (sandbox restriction on this agent's git access to sibling checkouts); findings below were cross-verified against the live default branch (main @ f77948d) via the GitHub API, not the possibly-stale local copy.
CRITICAL
None found this run.
High
cargo audit(workspace root):quinn-proto0.11.14, RUSTSEC-2026-0185 (7.5), remote memory exhaustion via unbounded out-of-order stream reassembly. Fix:>=0.11.15. Transitive (network-stack dependency; not resolvable to a single top-level crate viacargo treeon this host target — platform-conditional).
Medium
rsa0.9.10, RUSTSEC-2023-0071 (5.9), Marvin Attack timing side-channel key recovery — no fixed upgrade available upstream. Path:rsa ← jsonwebtoken ← magna-serv ← magna/magna-subscriptions. Worth prioritizing over its "medium" score alone: this sits in the JWT verification path (auth), not a dev-only tool.- NEW this week:
rustls0.23.39, RUSTSEC-2026-0285 (5.3, published 2026-09-14), TLS 1.3 handshake messages incorrectly accepted across encryption-level boundaries. Fix:>=0.23.45. Path:rustls ← tokio-rustls ← hyper-rustls/reqwest, andrustls ← sqlx-postgres. crossbeam-epoch0.9.18, RUSTSEC-2026-0204, invalid pointer dereference infmt::PointerforAtomic/Sharedwhen the pointer is invalid. Fix:>=0.9.20(unscored upstream; treating as medium given it's aDebug/Pointer-impl bug, not attacker-triggerable in normal request paths). Path:crossbeam-epoch ← moka ← magna-introspect ← magna/magna-build/magna-dataplan.- Workflows:
ci.ymlandgqlmin-size.ymlstill lack a top-levelpermissions:block. Fix already proposed, unmerged, in PR chore(security): add top-level permissions blocks to workflows #7 (open since last week). - Workflows, corrected finding:
actions/checkout@v4defaults topersist-credentials: true, and bothci.yml(4 jobs: test/clippy/fmt/publish-dry-run) andgqlmin-size.ymltrigger onpull_request. Per the sweep's explicit rule this should be flagged (last week's report said "no explicitpersist-credentials: true" but missed that the default counts too). Impact here is low in practice — this is a public repo and neither workflow uses secrets — but it's a real hardening gap: a PR build step could reuse the checked-out token. Not one of the three allowed mechanical-PR fix types, so reported only.
Low / informational (warnings, not vulnerabilities)
anyhow1.0.102, RUSTSEC-2026-0190 (unsoundError::downcast_mut()),event-listener5.4.1, RUSTSEC-2026-0221 (unsound!Sendcrossing),lru0.16.4, RUSTSEC-2026-0253 (use-after-free panic-safety inpop()— new warning this week, replacing last week'sspin"yanked" warning which no longer appears in this run'sCargo.lockresolution).- Actions referenced by tag/floating channel, not a pinned 40-char SHA:
actions/checkout@v4,Swatinem/rust-cache@v2, anddtolnay/rust-toolchain@nightly— this one floats on a rolling nightly channel, higher drift risk than a version tag. Finding only; no verified upstream SHA resolved this run. ci.yml'spublish-dry-runjob runscargo publish --dry-runonly — no real publish credentials touched; left alone per the "never touch publishing/release logic" constraint.- No
pull_request_target, no${{ github.event.* }}interpolation in anyrun:step.
Code grep — no findings
No hardcoded secrets, no eval(/new Function( (N/A, Rust workspace), no tracked .env*, no wrangler.toml/fly.toml (none in this repo), no SECURITY DEFINER/RLS patterns (no SQL migrations in this repo). Per this repo's own convention (library crates use thiserror, not anyhow) — not re-litigated here as it's a code-convention note, not a security finding, but flagged for awareness since anyhow also carries an advisory-db "unsound" warning on the pinned version.
Repo settings
SECURITY.mdpresent at root with a real disclosure contact — OK, unchanged.- Branch protection/rulesets/required checks/Actions permissions: not checked (see below).
Not checked this run
- Dependabot alerts, code-scanning alerts, secret-scanning alerts,
security_and_analysisfield — no API access available. - Branch protection / rulesets / required status checks — no API access available.
- GitHub Actions permissions settings (org/repo level) — no API access available.
Mechanical PR
Last week's PR #7 (claude/magna-security-2026-W38, draft, unmerged) already contains this week's needed fix (permissions blocks for ci.yml/gqlmin-size.yml) verbatim. No new PR opened this week to avoid a duplicate — recommend merging #7.
Activity
[-]Security sweep — 2026-W38[/-][+]Security sweep — 2026-W39[/+]srmcguirt commentedon Sep 21, 2026
Sweep 2026-W39 — changes since W38:
cargo auditgained one new advisory:rustls0.23.39, RUSTSEC-2026-0285 (medium, published 2026-09-14) — now 4 vulnerabilities instead of 3. Warnings composition changed: last week'sspin"yanked" warning no longer appears; this week showslru0.16.4 RUSTSEC-2026-0253 (use-after-free panic-safety) instead — still 3 warnings total.ci.ymlandgqlmin-size.ymlboth trigger onpull_requestand useactions/checkout@v4with default (true)persist-credentials— the sweep's rule covers the default, not just an explicittrue, which last week's pass didn't call out. Low practical impact (public repo, no secrets in these workflows) but noted for completeness.permissions:block andSECURITY.mdfindings unchanged. Last week's mechanical PR chore(security): add top-level permissions blocks to workflows #7 is still open/unmerged and covers exactly this week's needed fix — no new PR opened to avoid a duplicate. Recommend merging chore(security): add top-level permissions blocks to workflows #7.git fetch/resetthe local checkout (agent sandbox restriction); all findings were instead verified directly against the livemainbranch via the GitHub API.Generated by Claude Code