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Security sweep — 2026-W39 #6

Closed as duplicate
Closed as duplicate

Description

@srmcguirt

Automated weekly security sweep for fellwork/magna. GitHub access limited to mcp__github__* tools (no gh CLI, no raw REST) — see "Not checked" below. Local checkout could not be git fetch/reset this run (sandbox restriction on this agent's git access to sibling checkouts); findings below were cross-verified against the live default branch (main @ f77948d) via the GitHub API, not the possibly-stale local copy.

CRITICAL

None found this run.

High

  • cargo audit (workspace root): quinn-proto 0.11.14, RUSTSEC-2026-0185 (7.5), remote memory exhaustion via unbounded out-of-order stream reassembly. Fix: >=0.11.15. Transitive (network-stack dependency; not resolvable to a single top-level crate via cargo tree on this host target — platform-conditional).

Medium

  • rsa 0.9.10, RUSTSEC-2023-0071 (5.9), Marvin Attack timing side-channel key recovery — no fixed upgrade available upstream. Path: rsa ← jsonwebtoken ← magna-serv ← magna / magna-subscriptions. Worth prioritizing over its "medium" score alone: this sits in the JWT verification path (auth), not a dev-only tool.
  • NEW this week: rustls 0.23.39, RUSTSEC-2026-0285 (5.3, published 2026-09-14), TLS 1.3 handshake messages incorrectly accepted across encryption-level boundaries. Fix: >=0.23.45. Path: rustls ← tokio-rustls ← hyper-rustls/reqwest, and rustls ← sqlx-postgres.
  • crossbeam-epoch 0.9.18, RUSTSEC-2026-0204, invalid pointer dereference in fmt::Pointer for Atomic/Shared when the pointer is invalid. Fix: >=0.9.20 (unscored upstream; treating as medium given it's a Debug/Pointer-impl bug, not attacker-triggerable in normal request paths). Path: crossbeam-epoch ← moka ← magna-introspect ← magna / magna-build / magna-dataplan.
  • Workflows: ci.yml and gqlmin-size.yml still lack a top-level permissions: block. Fix already proposed, unmerged, in PR chore(security): add top-level permissions blocks to workflows #7 (open since last week).
  • Workflows, corrected finding: actions/checkout@v4 defaults to persist-credentials: true, and both ci.yml (4 jobs: test/clippy/fmt/publish-dry-run) and gqlmin-size.yml trigger on pull_request. Per the sweep's explicit rule this should be flagged (last week's report said "no explicit persist-credentials: true" but missed that the default counts too). Impact here is low in practice — this is a public repo and neither workflow uses secrets — but it's a real hardening gap: a PR build step could reuse the checked-out token. Not one of the three allowed mechanical-PR fix types, so reported only.

Low / informational (warnings, not vulnerabilities)

  • anyhow 1.0.102, RUSTSEC-2026-0190 (unsound Error::downcast_mut()), event-listener 5.4.1, RUSTSEC-2026-0221 (unsound !Send crossing), lru 0.16.4, RUSTSEC-2026-0253 (use-after-free panic-safety in pop() — new warning this week, replacing last week's spin "yanked" warning which no longer appears in this run's Cargo.lock resolution).
  • Actions referenced by tag/floating channel, not a pinned 40-char SHA: actions/checkout@v4, Swatinem/rust-cache@v2, and dtolnay/rust-toolchain@nightly — this one floats on a rolling nightly channel, higher drift risk than a version tag. Finding only; no verified upstream SHA resolved this run.
  • ci.yml's publish-dry-run job runs cargo publish --dry-run only — no real publish credentials touched; left alone per the "never touch publishing/release logic" constraint.
  • No pull_request_target, no ${{ github.event.* }} interpolation in any run: step.

Code grep — no findings

No hardcoded secrets, no eval(/new Function( (N/A, Rust workspace), no tracked .env*, no wrangler.toml/fly.toml (none in this repo), no SECURITY DEFINER/RLS patterns (no SQL migrations in this repo). Per this repo's own convention (library crates use thiserror, not anyhow) — not re-litigated here as it's a code-convention note, not a security finding, but flagged for awareness since anyhow also carries an advisory-db "unsound" warning on the pinned version.

Repo settings

  • SECURITY.md present at root with a real disclosure contact — OK, unchanged.
  • Branch protection/rulesets/required checks/Actions permissions: not checked (see below).

Not checked this run

  • Dependabot alerts, code-scanning alerts, secret-scanning alerts, security_and_analysis field — no API access available.
  • Branch protection / rulesets / required status checks — no API access available.
  • GitHub Actions permissions settings (org/repo level) — no API access available.

Mechanical PR

Last week's PR #7 (claude/magna-security-2026-W38, draft, unmerged) already contains this week's needed fix (permissions blocks for ci.yml/gqlmin-size.yml) verbatim. No new PR opened this week to avoid a duplicate — recommend merging #7.

Activity

  1. added
    agent-readyWell-specified and trusted; daily code routine may implement
    bugSomething isn't working
    on Sep 18, 2026
  2. changed the title [-]Security sweep — 2026-W38[/-] [+]Security sweep — 2026-W39[/+] on Sep 21, 2026
  3. srmcguirt commented on Sep 21, 2026

    @srmcguirt
    MemberAuthor

    Sweep 2026-W39 — changes since W38:

    • cargo audit gained one new advisory: rustls 0.23.39, RUSTSEC-2026-0285 (medium, published 2026-09-14) — now 4 vulnerabilities instead of 3. Warnings composition changed: last week's spin "yanked" warning no longer appears; this week shows lru 0.16.4 RUSTSEC-2026-0253 (use-after-free panic-safety) instead — still 3 warnings total.
    • Corrected/added finding this week: ci.yml and gqlmin-size.yml both trigger on pull_request and use actions/checkout@v4 with default (true) persist-credentials — the sweep's rule covers the default, not just an explicit true, which last week's pass didn't call out. Low practical impact (public repo, no secrets in these workflows) but noted for completeness.
    • permissions: block and SECURITY.md findings unchanged. Last week's mechanical PR chore(security): add top-level permissions blocks to workflows #7 is still open/unmerged and covers exactly this week's needed fix — no new PR opened to avoid a duplicate. Recommend merging chore(security): add top-level permissions blocks to workflows #7.
    • Note: this run could not git fetch/reset the local checkout (agent sandbox restriction); all findings were instead verified directly against the live main branch via the GitHub API.

    Generated by Claude Code

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